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The IMF Deal 
 
After more than a year of negotiations with the IMF, 
the Argentine government got an agreement signed on 
January 24th, 2003. It was obtained in spite of great 
opposition on the part of the directorship of the IMF and of 
several of the members of its advisory council. The reason 
for the change in position of the IMF were three. First, 
some of the main shareholders of the IMF (US, Spain, Italy 
and France) pushed for an agreement to secure the 
investment positions in Argentina; second, the 
improvement in economic performance of Argentina during 
the second half of 2002 took away the arguments from the 
IMF and the US and European press that no negotiation 
was possible with a country on a free fall; and third, the 
IMF itself was in risk of having a US$1bn loan defaulted 
by Argentina (plus a US$680m. default to the IADB and a 
US$800m to the World Bank). Therefore, the combination 
of these three factors pushed the IMF to sign an agreement 
with Argentina then, and in the following conditions: 
 
1. Agreement is only transitional, until August 2003, 
when a new one must be negotiated with the new 
government elected in Argentina in April-May. 
2. IMF agrees to refinance US$6.6bn due to be repaid in 
2003 plus US$4.4bn more owed to the WB and the 
IADB. 
3. Argentina had to pay the amounts listed as defaulted 
above to the IFIs. 
4. Argentina will get a federal fiscal surplus of 1.9% of 
GDP in these 8 months, up from the 0.5% already 
obtained in 2002. Furthermore, fiscal expenditure is 
due to contract by 1.5% of GDP. 
5. Argentina must issue bonds to cover the totality of the 
banking system’s cost of the pesification. 
6. Social assistance programs must by limited to 1.2% of 
GDP, to be now audited by the WB and IADB to 
improve performance and “push people off assistance 
and back to the job market” (page 9 of Memorandum 
de Entendimiento listed in the website of the Ministry 
of Economy). 
7. Provincial government budgets must be adjusted to 
reach a surplus of 0.4% of GDP by August, up from 
the 0.5% of deficit obtained in 2002. No further debts 
can be taken by provinces in lieu of future tax 
earnings. 
8. The Central Bank can not expand monetary circulation 
by more than 5% in the year, but is allowed to further 
indebt itself for up to US$50m in the domestic market 
to absorb liquidity and reduce inflation. 
9. Argentina must adjust privatized utility rates 
according to the inflation rate and compensate these 
companies for any losses due to unadjusted rates 
during 2002. The IMF demands no target but its 
political pressure on Argentina is extreme in this point. 
Argentina so far refuses to compensate for past losses 
but admits some adjustment is necessary. 
10. Central Bank officials of restructuring the financial 
sector in agreement with the current bank owners are 
to grant total immunity from future legal prosecution 
and the Congress or the Courts cannot appeal the deals 
they reach with private bankers. Main points of this 
restructuring are: a) reduction of the operations of state 
banks and their preparation for privatization, b) 
reduction of the number of operating private banks and 
their transference to “able management with 
international expertise” (meaning the forceful sale of 
domestic private banks to foreign banks). This task is 
to be done under the supervision of the IMF and the 
WB. 
 
Economic Policy  
 
Fiscal Policy 
Continuing the tendency from the last semester of 
2002, the first quarter of 2003 showed growing fiscal 
surpluses. This is the result of growing tax collection in 
nominal terms due to inflation, while most state expenses 
are frozen. State salaries and pensions have got no increase 
after the 100 pesos across the board given in October, 
accumulating a fall in purchasing power of 35% if 
measured by consumer inflation. Foreign debt payments to 
private creditors are suspended until the renegotiation takes 
place after the presidential elections of April. On the state 
income side, the new taxes on exports put early last year 
continue to be the star, reaching 12.5% of total revenues in 
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January-March. The value added tax, a mainstay during the 
Convertibility years, was reduced to 19% from 21% in 
October last year to boost consumer spending but failed in 
that purpose, as producers and distributors simply absorbed 
it to enlarge their slim margins. By January 2003, it was 
increased again to 21% but it has stagnated, showing an 
increase of only 7% respect to the previous January, in 
spite of all the inflation accumulated since. Wealth and 
corporate taxes continue to show very little participation 
and nil increases as tax pressure on the wealthiest has 
reached a new low, with over 80% of firms and wealthy 
individual not paying them. Other taxes that contributed, 
however, were the financial transactions tax and the fuel 
tax, both recently implemented (2001 and 2002, 
respectively). 
The Ministry of Economy sent a fiscal reform package 
to the Congress in late December and it is still there, being 
discussed. The main issues at stake are a 2-year extension 
in the financial transactions tax, a reduction in corporate 
taxes from 35 to 30% and the extension of income tax to 
cover export tax rebates, so far exempt; a reduction in the 
wealth tax for those who had their savings blocked last year 
in the banking system freeze, the abolition of regional 
development tax rebate schemes for the poorest provinces, 
the transformation of the fuel tax from a percentage to an 
ad-valorem sum to increase the profits of the oil and 
refining sectors.  
 
Monetary Policy  
The main news in this aspect is the continuation of the 
de-freezing of funds blocked in the banking system. In 
December 2002, all saving and checking accounts 
(corralito) were freed, for an amount close to $20bn but not 
all at once. First, the smallest depositors and gradually, the 
larger ones. By April, only the largest were still awaiting 
for defreeze. Contrary to IMF and neoliberal expectations, 
these funds did not push the dollar upwards or even, for the 
most part, left the banking system. Many medium and 
larger depositors did have their funds moved to time 
deposits, taking advantage of high real interest rates. In 
view of that success, the government pushed the envelope 
and in March, announced a schedule to free the rest of the 
accounts (time deposits or corralon) blocked since 
December 2001. Small amounts will be freed first, again, 
and the real test will come as larger amounts are released in 
May, which is around the time of the ballotage of the 
presidential elections of April. Unless the more neoliberal 
of the candidates (those would be Menem or Lopez 
Murphy) looks favored to win then, large depositors are 
expected to make a show of force pushing the dollar 
upwards to intimidate voters and the government. 
It is precisely in the policies followed to manage the 
exchange rate that the most curious results have been 
achieved. As seen in the graph below, the exchange rate 
increased abruptly in the first semester of 2002, then 
stabilize around 3.5 pesos per US dollar, to start a descend 
in December that has continued into the first trimester of 
2003. The Central Bank (CB) has made strong efforts 
(within the limits imposed by the IMF1) to slow down the 
                                                
                                                                       
1 One of the conditions the IMF put to negotiate is that the Central 
Bank must intervine as little as possible in the exchange market 
revaluing of the peso but to no avail. These were the 
gradual deregulation of the exchange market, eliminating 
the CB authorization requirement for operations over 
$150,000, easing the restrictions on profit remittances and 
foreign debt payment and eliminating the requirement for 
exporters to sell their dollars to the CB for operations of 
less than US$1m. Given all these liberalizing moves in 3 
months in a currency market with only a few million 
dollars of movement per day, one would expect the peso to 
weaken after the pressure it had endured before but the 
opposite happened. The dollar reached 2.9 pesos on 
average during the first 2 weeks of April. The government 
has asked the IMF to allow an expansion of the money 
supply to reach an exchange rate of 3.1 pesos per dollar, 
which is the rate planned in the 2003 budget and the one 
which gives the state optimal income from exports taxes. 
Most of the Argentine production sector strongly supports 
this idea but the foreign-dominated banking sector and a 
few manufacturing multinationals with high import bills 
prefer it otherwise. 
 
Economic Performance  
 
The first trimester of 2003 continued the trend of the last 
semester of 2002, when the economy recovered slowly 
from the tremendous depth of the recession of 1999-2002. 
While the last trimester of 2002 showed an increase of 2% 
in the GDP, the first of 2003 added another 3%. That is 
however a very slow pace when compared with 
Indonesia’s, for example, which also suffered a 
catastrophic crisis in 1997 and recovered at 8-10% in the 
first quarters after it. In the case of Argentina, the problem 
of this slow recovery is that it creates very little net 
employment. While unemployment decreased from May to 
October from 21.5% to 17.8%, it still remains very high2. 
While the main industries in the service sector such as 
banking, education, transport and utilities, expelled 
workers, only manufacturing took some for import 
substituting industries such as textile and machine tooling. 
In fact, the government used an accounting trick to show 
such decrease in unemployment, by including the 600,000 
beneficiaries of the programa jefes y jefas de hogar, a 
minimum income plan started in 2002. The May 
employment statistics will also show them and only then, 
one will see how much real employment this economic 
recovery is creating. Preliminary calculations are around 
100,000 jobs created since September 2002 until March 
2003. To reach a 10% unemployment level, Argentina 
would need to create jobs at this pace for 9 more years. 
 
and it can not expand the money supply as the IMF still fears a 
return to high inflation.   
2 Unemployment is measured in Argentina only twice a year (May 
and October) and limited to the largest metropolitan areas. 
Employed is anyone who has worked full time in the previous 
week, undereployed is someone who has worked less than that and 
wanted to work full time. Unemployed is someone actively looking 
for a job in that week (has gone to see at least two different job 
offerings). Obviously, this method leads to large undercounting of 
under and unemployment. 
Table 1 : Main Economic Indicators, 2002 - 2003 
 
          
  Units 2-Jan 2-Feb 2-Mar 2-Apr 2-May 2-Jun 2-Jul 2-Aug 2-Sep 2-Oct 2-Nov 2-Dec 3-Jan 3-Feb 
Public Finances                
Total Tax Collection $ millions 3,411 3,001 3,077 2,884 4,827 4,615 4,987 4,731 4,344 4,764  5,021 4,814 5,601 4,654
Gross VAT $ millions 1,009 1,027 1,036 899 1,511 1,403 1,413 1,364 1,340 1,424 1,502 1,314 1,686 1,354
Corporate Earnings $ millions 623 469 480 433 893 833 764 844 683 849 1,111 938 1,095 803
Social Security $ millions 749 595 528 528 709 656 915 702 680 741 687 693 1,006 713
Foreign Trade $ millions 67 69 168 309 554 710 865 812 609 745 769 653 815 743
External Sector                
Export of Goods (FOB) US$ millions 1,823 1,801 2,060 2,146 2,343 2,213 2,211 2,151 2,251 2,229 2,160 1,960 2,126 2,072
Import of Goods (CIF) US$ millions 853 627 592 611 862 687 813 764 717 874 807 782 798 777
Trade Balance of Goods US$ millions 970 1,174 1,468 1,535 1,481 1,526 1,398 1,387 1,534 1,355 1,353 1,179 1,328 1,295
Liquid Reserves  
of Central Bank US$ millions 13,947 13,871 12,780 12,171 10,185 9,629 8,986 9,102 9,404 9,787 10,022 10,485 9,326 10,226
Exchange Rate (nominal) $/U$S 1,40 2.15 2.9 2.95 3.6 3.8 3.68 3.62 3.73 3.53 3.57 3.36 3.24 3.2
Money                 
Bank Deposits $ millions 78,932 73,541 71,218 64,116 60,153 58,577 56,927 57,612 57,587 58,899 61,510 61,200 64,105 64,771
M3 $ millions 88,283 82,831 83,418 77,273 73,554 71,610 70,375 70,878 70,484 71,959 75,279 77,576 80,397 81,359
Interest Rate                
Deposits % 5.53 7.61 15.05 46 64.58 72.17 76.7 65.05 44.46 34.13 19.01 20.72 17.03 17.55
Loans % 29.53 31.92 - - - - - 102.38 78.83 55.24 39.41 33.48 27.49 27.43
Capital Markets                
Merval Stock Index  
(in US$ ) Var.%  -24.1 -14.6 -17.8 -15.1 -33.7 3.8 4.7 7.4 3.9 14.1 12.4 12.6 10.5 8.2
Discount strip  Basic points  3,944 3,663 4,192 3,662 4,268 4,430 5,284 7,748 9,226 4,434 3,779 5,821 5,239 4,260
FRB  Basic points 11,605 12,066 12,276 13,843 21,548 34,020 36,603 45,328 25,090 23,713 27,804 31,628 38,462 31,836
 
Source: Ministry of Economy and INDEC 
 
 
 
 
Graph 1 : Industrial Production Index  
January 1st 2002 base = 100 
 
Source: National Bureau of Aggregate Accounting, INDEC, 3/2003 
The main obstacle to overcome the recession has been the 
lack of credit. This was related initially to the issue of the 
blocked deposits and the legal battles that ensued on that 
last year. Banks were reluctant to lent since they did not 
know whether they would need that money to pay back 
depositors back and at what exchange rate for the 
dollarized deposits. In consequence, they did not lend and 
recalled as many loans as possible. As the depositor’s 
issues started to be settled in September 2002, banks were a 
bit more flexible but the monetary policy of keeping the 
exchange rate stable and reducing inflation pushed the state 
to issue a large amount of treasury bonds to absorb pesos. 
Banks bought those, as they were very profitable and safe. 
That moved accomplished monetary stabilization but at the 
cost of lowering crowding out investment and slowing 
growth. All these sacrifices in the name of monetary 
orthodoxy were done in order to please the IMF and arrive 
to an agreement with it. Now that this is done, these 
policies can not be changed as the IMF fixed them into the 
written deal. It can be seen in the graph below that deposits 
have grown much faster than credits since September 2002 
until now. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 : Industrial Activity, Investment, Labor Market and Inflation 
 
 
          
  Unit 2-Jan 2-Feb 2-Mar 2-Apr 2-May 2-Jun 2-Jul 2-Aug 2-Sep 2-Oct 2-Nov 2-Dec 3-Jan 3-Feb 
Industrial Activity                             
Industrial  
Monthly Estimator Var.% 1 month -3.3 0.8 -1.4 -0.1 2.4 1.7 -1.4 2.7 0.3 1.4 3.3 2.6 3.4 1.5
 Var.% 12 months -20 -16.9 -22.3 -15.1 -14.6 -15.7 -12.2 -8.5 -4.6 -4.2 0.6 10.7 17.9 17.5
Investment       
Cement Sales Var.% 12 months -39 -41.9 -32.4 -38.5 -31.9 -31.3 -30.3 -22 -18.1 -11.7 -22.2 4 21.4 23.1
Import of  
Capital Goods (CIF) Var.% 1 month -27.7 -39.4 -9.9 -24.4 142.9 -54.9 20.8 24.1 -12 69.5 -34.2 13.2 -19.9 19.8
 Var.% 12 months -62.2 -73.5 -78.4 -83.6 -65.8 -80.1 -74.6 -71.8 -67.4 -44.6 -54.5 -45.6 -39.8 19
Labor market               
Economically  
Active Population % - - - - 41.8 - - - - 42.9 - - - -
Employed % - - - - 32.8 - - - - 35.3 - - - -
Unemployed % - - - - 21.5 - - - - 17.8 - - - -
Price Indexes                
IPC (retail) Var.% 1 month 2.3 3.1 4 10.4 4 3.6 3.2 2.3 1.3 0.2 0.5 0.2 1.3 0.6
IPIM (wholesale) Var.% 1 month 6.7 11.3 13.1 19.9 12.3 8.5 4.6 5 2.4 0.5 -1.7 -0.4 0.4 0.4
 
Source: Ministry of Economy and INDEC 
The different economic sectors have had rather distinct 
performances these last months. Agricultural activities 
shrank only slightly during 2002 and have expanded along 
2003, as the devaluation made dollar earnings from exports 
a much more attractive proposition. Soybeans harvests 
grew by 8%, sunflower by 15% while corn and wheat 
decreased slightly. These are reactions to world prices. 
Those producers more dependent on the home market, such 
as dairy farms and poultry factories decreased by 30% their 
production as the local consumption fell drastically and 
many of their production inputs were imported. The crisis 
and devaluation in Brazil during late 2002 also affected 
these industries. The performance of this sector adds little 
to the overall economy in terms of employment and local 
input consumption but their dollar earnings are crucial to 
maintain a positive balance of payments. 
Industry was detailed already but beyond that, a current 
of import substitution across most production lines is 
observed. While Argentina used to import more than 60% 
of its intermediate goods and 95% of its capital goods 
during the Convertibility years, it is now importing only 
30% of the first and 55% of the second. This points to the 
probable capacity of local industry to generate competitive 
products in the future. Nonetheless, a clearer picture will be 
obtained once this year finishes and more firm trends are 
visible. 
The recession in Brazil and the sluggish growth in 
NAFTA and the EU have also affected the possibilities of 
accelerated recovery in Argentina. In spite of a devaluation 
of the peso of over 50% in real terms (discounting 
inflation), exports actually fell 5% during 2002, compared 
to 2001. They are however performing better in early 2003, 
with an inter-annual growth of 10%. The story varies 
greatly according to destination, with Mercosur falling by 
more than 20%, EU and NAFTA growing by 10% and the 
rest, increasing some 15% as well, with Asia as the main 
market there. 
Those industrial sectors most heavily dependent on the 
home and Brazilian markets and with a large amount of 
imported inputs such as the car manufacturers are in dire 
straits. Fiat has not produced a single vehicle since October 
2002, laying off 30% of its workforce and putting the rest 
on half-paid leave. Renault is working at 20% capacity, 
while Peugeot, Toyota, Mercedes-Chrysler and the rest are 
in similar conditions. In 2002, the car market in Argentina 
registered as few sales as in 1959, only 80,000 vehicles. 
The first trimester of 2003 has seen sales increased only 
marginally and less than 100,000 sales are expected for the 
whole year. Unless export markets are found, most of these 
factories are due to close this year. Other examples of very 
troubled industrial sectors are paper mills and fishing, 
where output has so far fallen over 50% from the depressed 
levels of 2001. 
Therefore, a mixed picture remains in terms of 
economic performance albeit the trend is positive. 
Depending on the results of the coming presidential 
elections, this might change for the better or worse. The 
same applies for economic policy and the coming new 
round of bargaining with the IMF in August. With 
depressed incomes, widespread poverty and a huge foreign 
debt to be renegotiated, the economy is in expectations of 
the new administration to take office in late May.  
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